TELEVISION VIOLENCE PROFILE: THE TURNING POINT From Research to Action

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George Gerbner

The Annenberg School for Communication University of Pennsylvania

Michael Morgan

Department of Communication University of Massachusetts, Amherst

> Nancy Signorielli Department of Communication University of Delaware

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Concerns about television violence -- as about violence in other media -- have led to much research and controversy since the earliest days of the medium. Yet, despite political shifts and technological developments, the debate has remained at a virtual standstill. That is, until the 1992-93 television season.

That was a time of turning-point in the television violence debate. Agitation, legislation, high-level consultation, grass-roots organization and even implausible scapegoating ("television made me do it!") moved up high in public attention and the political agenda. By year's end, discussion about television violence saturated the media almost as much as its subject matter. The cultural climate was ripe for action. The only guestion was what kind.

This Violence Profile (16th in the series) also goes beyond the usual research on trends. It attempts to change some terms of the debate and to suggest action alternatives. We note that, despite some muting of dramatic violence, the deeper problems of its burdens and dynamics still persist. We find that heavy viewers are more likely than comparable groups of light viewers to conceive of their reality as mean and gloomy and to act accordingly. We suggest a way of resolving disputes about measurement. And, finally, we examine structural forces, not audience demand, driving commercial violence and offer a liberating alternative to the repressive movements in the field.

A highly publicized special issue of *TV Guide* on August 22, 1992, may have triggered the turnabout. "No topic," the lead article began, "touches a nerve in American homes as does violence on television..." Soon thereafter, ten Senators signed a letter to television executives demanding "voluntary controls" on violence. Before long, at least nine bills were introduced in Congress to curb television violence.

Attorney General Janet Reno and Health and Human Services Secretary Donna Shalala, along with Department of Education Secretary Richard W. Riley, convened in Washington, D.C. a "National Consultation on Violence." Their report, released in July, declared that "The issue of media violence is really just the first phase of a major cultural debate about life in the 21st Century. What kind of people do we want our children to become? What kind of culture will best give them the environment they will need to grow up healthy and whole?" They recommended that citizens "Take lessons from the environmental movement to form a 'cultural environmental' movement."

Leaders of the television industry declared their intention to run disclaimers and "parental advisories," a move that satisfied no one, and organized **their** "Industry-Wide Leadership Conference on Violence in Television Programming." The August 2, 1993, conference in Los Angeles was the first time that the electronic media industries invited legislators, educators, researchers and representatives of citizens groups to discuss a matter of programming policy. It was dubbed the "Violence Summit" by the international media crowding into its hotel ballroom. Covered by all major networks, broadcast live by CNN and later aired in full by C-SPAN, the conference marked the widest public recognition to date that the issue of violence will not go away and that it is part of the broader problem of cultural policy-making.

When Janet Reno, speaking at a Congressional hearing and Donna Shalala, writing in the journal Health Affairs, repeated their call for action in ever more forceful terms, they found the industry deeply divided and apprehensive. "Top cop Janet Reno may have turned Congress's anti-TV violence bandwagon into a runaway freight train," exclaimed Variety (Nov. 1, 1993, p.25). Some called for a counterattack. "Up to now" said "a network source" cited in the trade paper Broadcasting & Cable (Oct. 25, 1993, p. 6), "we have tried to be good guys...I think you'll see a change in how we react." Other voices quoted by Broadcasting & Cable complained that "we're not getting any credit for what we've already done." Within five days of Reno's testimony (Oct. 26, 1993), a lengthy front-page feature article in the New York Times was headlined "Doubts on Reno's Competence Rise in Justice Dept."

Others, like CBS Broadcast Group President Howard Stringer, complained that the networks had already toned down their programs. Capital Cities/ABC announced plans for independent monitoring of violence, as the cable networks had done the year before (see Appendix Table 10). On the other hand, Ron Alridge, publisher and editorial director of the trade paper *Electronic Media* commended "plain talking Janet Reno" and declared that "The war against violence has escalated to the point that mere disclaimers will no longer suffice." (Oct. 25, 1993, p. 30.)

The Television Violence Act, already in force, offered limited exemption from the threat of antitrust action if the industry responds. If not, warned the Act's chief sponsor, Senator Paul Simon (D.,Ill.), harsher legislation will follow. His "ultimatum" was to expire in January 1994, bringing the turnaround to full circle.

The Violence Profile

The Violence Profile is a periodic report of two types of investigation. The first, Message System Analysis, addresses the question of what viewers see, i.e., the content shown on television, and is summarized in the Violence Index. The second, Cultivation Analysis, focuses on consequences of living with and learning from television.

The Violence Index has been compiled annually since 1967. Cultivation Analysis results have been published as part of the Violence Profile since 1972 and in numerous publications listed in the Bibliography. The last Violence Profile covered the years from 1967 through 1989. This report extends the analysis through the 1992-93 season and includes special studies of non-fiction and cable-originated programs¹.

The Violence Profile is part of the Cultural Indicators project based at the University of Pennsylvania's Annenberg School for Communication. Cultural Indicators is a database and an ongoing research project that relates recurrent features of the world of television to viewer conceptions of reality. Its cumulative computer archives contain observations on 2,816 programs and 34,882 characters coded according to many thematic, demographic and action categories.

The research began in 1967-68 with a study for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. It continued, at various times, under the sponsorship of the Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Social Behavior, the National Institute of Mental Health, The White House Office of Telecommunications Policy, the American Medical Association, the Administration on Aging, the National Science Foundation, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Screen Actors' Guild, the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, the National Cable Television Association, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the Turner Broadcasting System, the Office of Substance Abuse Prevention and the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention of the U.S. Public Health Service and other organizations.

Past reports have focused on television's contributions to images of women and minorities; sex-role stereotypes; occupations; political orientation; aging; disability; mental illness; death and dying; school achievement and

¹ Amy Nyman, Cynthia Kandra and Nejat Ozyegin assisted in the preparation of the Violence Index and Doug McLeod helped with the collection of the University of Delaware sample.

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aspirations; health-related issues such as safety, nutrition, and medicine; science and scientists; family life; religion; adoption, and other issues. It has also been extended to comparative studies of television content and effects in several countries.

The Violence Index

Violence is a social relationship. People hurt or kill to force (or deter) unwanted behavior, to dominate, to terrorize. Symbolic violence is literally a "show of force." It demonstrates power: who can get away with what against whom.

We define violence in a way that does not presume effects (as so much public discussion does) but, on the contrary, establishes the basis for research on the cultivation of many potential consequences. They include such socializing processes as accommodation to one's place in a power structure; a sense of victimization; and vulnerability, mistrust and dependency, as well as of aggression and violations of the social order.

Our measures are based on the reliable observation of clear-cut, unambiguous, and overt episodes of physical violence -- hurting or killing or the threat of hurting and/or killing in any context. Idle threats, verbal abuse, or gestures without hurting or killing (or threatening to do so) are not coded as violence.

We record any act of violence that fits the definition, regardless of conventional notions about types of portrayals that may have "harmful" effects. We include violence that occurs in a realistic and serious or fantasy or humorous context. "Accidental" violence and "acts of nature" are recorded because fictional violence is always purposefully contrived, always claims victims, and always demonstrates There is also considerable research evidence that power. humor and fantasy are effective forms in which to convey serious lessons (Bandura et al., 1967; Ellis & Sekura, 1972; Lovas, 1961). Fantasy, comic, "natural" and "accidental" violence all demonstrate relationships of power and vulnerability. Humor may be the sugar coating on the pill, making it more acceptable, enjoyable, and easily digestible than in other "serious" forms. Eliminating it from the analysis would be a major conceptual error.

The units of analysis are the dramatic program as a whole, each character (speaking part) in the program, and the violent scene (defined as a scene of violence with the same characters on the scene; when a character leaves or enters a new scene begins). Trained coders analyze weeklong videotaped samples of each season's programs using an extensively tested instrument of analysis. The instrument 5

requires the reliable observation by independent coders of many aspects of the programs and their characterizations. All programs and all speaking characters in the samples are included in the analysis.

The Violence Index combines three sets of observations to provide a single indicator sensitive to a range of program characteristics. The observations record (1) the percent of programs containing any violence (%P); (2) the rate of violent scenes per program (R/P) and per hour (R/H); and (3) the percent of major characters involved in violence (%V) either as perpetrators or victims or both. The Violence Index is the sum of these measures with the rates of violent scenes and the percent of major characters involved in killing weighted by a factor of two. The formula is VI=%P+2R/P+2R/H+%V+%K. Its purpose is to facilitate comparisons over time and across networks and types of programs. The individual components on which the Violence Index is based are tabulated separately and can be seen on the Tables in the Appendix.

Trends

Violence on prime-time major network dramatic programs, as measured by the Violence Index (Figures 1 and 2; Tables 1 through 4), declined slightly in the 1989-90 season and has remained for the past three years below its 20-year average. Although 65.0 percent of prime-time fictional dramatic programs and 45.6 percent of their casts are still involved in violence, the perpetrators are perhaps less busy: the average frequency of violent scenes per hour in 1993 was 2.9, about three-fifths of the 20-year average.

Saturday morning children's programs, traditionally the most violent, present a mixed picture (Tables 5 through 8). More than 9 out of 10 programs (90.3 percent) and 8 out of 10 characters (81.0 percent) were involved in violence in the last season studied. But while children's programs in 1990-91 were saturated with a record high of 32 violent scenes per hour, by 1992-93 the rate declined to 17.9 violent scenes per hour. All networks and all measures of violence, however, did not share in the decline. The 1992-93 Violence Index was slightly higher than the previous year's, but still below the 20-year average.

The rise of "reality" programs based on purportedly true accounts of often violent events prompted a special analysis of non-fictional programs; these had not been included in previous studies. An analysis of a week of all prime-time programs broadcast on ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox in February 1993 was conducted at the University of Delaware. In addition to "reality" programs, this analysis included variety shows, news/magazine programs as well as the traditional dramatic fare (situation comedies, action

programs, dramas, and TV movies).

The analysis finds that violence in "reality" programs is a close second to dramatic action shows (Table 9). The 7 variety shows in the sample were saturated with 13 violent scenes per program (11.4 per hour), mostly of the "kick-inthe-groin" variety of "humor." News/information magazine shows were considerably less violent. The overall Violence Index including "reality" and other "non-fiction" (117.5) is slightly below the comparable fictional-dramatic program Index (127.2).

Another special study focused on violence in cableoriginated programs (those **produced** by cable networks rather than all programs carried by them) for the 1990-91 season. (Table 10. For a full report see Gerbner, 1993a.) Cableoriginated children's programs had substantially less violence than children's programs broadcast on the networks. On the other hand, cable-originated general programming and particularly action programs were more violent than similar programs broadcast on the networks.

Flap over measurement

When some of these results were first released, just before the Los Angeles conference, some network executives used the occasion to publicize long-standing criticism of the research. They complained that cable networks and movies are even more violent than the major broadcast networks and yet they are not included in the Index. They said that our "bizarre bit of bean-counting does not hold up to scrutiny" because we treat slapstick comedy the same as serious gunplay. They dismissed our study as "nonsensical" because we found violence in "I Dream of Jeannie."

These arguments have been made and refuted for at least 25 years. The Violence Index focuses on broadcasters whose programs are viewed by most people and who receive their licenses to serve "the public interest, convenience, and necessity." Cable-originated programs have also been studied and the results released separately (see Gerbner, 1993a). As to violence in slapstick comedy, coders have to find that there is an overt physical threat or action to hurt or kill. A slap or a slip is not necessarily coded as violent unless the character can or does get hurt. Making it seem funny or happy does not change its lessons.

Concerning Jeannie, she was seized upon some 25 years ago and trotted out ever since as an example of absurdity. In fact, the episode of "I Dream of Jeannie" in our sample did have a very violent dream sequence.

It is, of course, possible for reasonable people to disagree over whether or not a specific action or event in a

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program should be considered violent. But continued squabbles about technical methodological details of definition and measurement deflect attention from more serious areas of agreement and consensus. The concerns of the public and the Congress over pervasive, gratuitous, and formulaic violence have clearly reached the boiling point, and the networks have recognized and acknowledged the urgency of these concerns. Therefore, it is now more important than ever, for all concerned, to have reliable and objective measures of violence on the airwaves, and we invite the networks to join us in our effort to generate such valid and comprehensive indicators. Their coders can work alongside our coders and follow the same ground rules; let the chips fall where they may.

The dynamics of violence

Violence is a complex scenario. It involves a wide range of motivations, circumstances, and justifications. It sends out messages about power and vulnerability, problemsolving, human relations, law enforcement, consequences of actions, and the rules of society. Many of these "lessons" may be interpreted differently by different viewers, although it is hard to conceive of infants "interpreting" the television they see. So on a more basic and general level, any sustained exposure to dramatic violence may cultivate similar assumptions about power and vulnerability regardless of whether the violence is "gratuitous" or justified, if the social relationships involved (who can get away with what against whom) are stereotyped, repetitive, and pervasive.

The Violence Index was not designed to do justice to subtleties and complexities of individual works. Close, detailed interpretations of single works, such as those of television critics, may provide compelling insights about specific acts in specific dramatic contexts. Our analysis serves a different purpose. It is more a bird's-eye-view of familiar territory, showing not what individual viewers may see at a particular time but the inescapable common features to which large communities are exposed from infancy on and over long periods of time. The repetitive daily experience of who gets away with what against whom, regardless of reasons or justifications, has a message of its own. It is the message of power and risk, of violents and victims, of a dramatic "pecking order."

Obviously, all violence is not alike. Violence can be seen as a legitimate and even necessary cultural expression if it is not a vast "overkill" of inequitable one-sided victimizations, and if it conveys valid lesson about human consequences. There is murder in Shakespeare, mayhem in fairy tales, blood and gore in mythology. But Greek drama, often cited for its compelling pathos and cathartic effects, showed only the tragic consequences of violence on stage; "Greek sensibilities," observes theater historian Oscar G. Brockett (1979, p. 98) "dictate that scenes of extreme violence take place offstage, although the results...might be shown."

Individually crafted and historically inspired, the sparingly and selectively used symbolic violence of powerful stories is capable of balancing tragic costs against deadly compulsions. However, under the increasing pressures of global marketing, graphic screen imagery is produced for worldwide entertainment and sales on the dramatic assemblyline. This "happy violence" is swift, cool, thrilling, painless, effective, designed not to upset but to lead to a happy ending and to deliver an audience to the advertiser's message in a receptive mood.

The marketing strategies driving mass-produced violence affect the total tone and context of programming. The scenario begins with casting and fate, the subtitle of a study prepared for the Screen Actors Guild and the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (Gerbner, 1993c). It found that women play one out of three characters in prime time, one out of four in Saturday morning children's programs, and one out of five in the news. With a predominantly male cast, and given the typical action scenario, the stage is set for stories of power, conflict, violence. The SAG-AFTRA study found that most of those who are underrepresented are also those who, when portrayed, suffer the worst fate.

Television did not invent the formula. But, unlike other media, it requires no literacy, comes into the home, and its relatively non-selective viewing ritual starts in infancy. Children are its captive audience.

Is violence avoidable?

As a medium, television is not comparable to other media. It pervades the entire community and the cultural environment of the home. The proliferation of channels with the coming of cable and VCR's has not led to greater diversity of production or of actual viewing. (See e.g. Morgan and Shanahan, 1991b., Gerbner, 1993b, Gerbner et al., 1993) A study of "The Limits of Selective Viewing" (Sun, 1989) related frequent thematic categories including romance, family, business, education, nature, science, religion and the supernatural to the incidence of violence. The study found that, on the whole, television presents a relatively small set of common themes, and violence pervades all of them. A major network viewer looking for a nature or family theme, for example, would find violence in 7 or 8 out of every 10 programs. Of course it is possible to view non-violent programs, but only for short periods of time at certain hours. The majority of network viewers who watch more than 3 hours in the evening have little choice of thematic context or cast of character types, and virtually no chance of avoiding violence.

A calculus of risks

Violence defines character and enhances importance. Fewer than one out of three (31 percent) of all characters but more than half (52 percent) of major characters are involved in violence in any given week.

In the total cast of all characters, 17 percent commit violence. The most violent are young adult males (27 percent), Hispanic Americans (26 percent), settled adult males (22 percent), and lower class characters (17 percent).

The overall rate of victimization is 21 percent. The most violent groups also run the highest risks of victimization: young adult males (34 percent), Hispanic Americans (32 percent), and lower class characters (31 percent). Settled adult males are the exception: their rate of victimization is only 23 percent.

The ratio of violence to victimization defines the price to be paid for committing violence. Generally speaking, as the most violent groups also tend to be the most victimized, they both commit and suffer violence in roughly similar proportions. When give and take are alike, the relative price of violence is close to average. When a group can dish it out with relative impunity, the price is low. When a group absorbs much more violence than it commits (i.e. in excess of the standard ratio), the price is high.

The average price for all characters, i.e. number of victims per 10 violents, is 12. Women, children, old people and other minorities tend to be underrepresented and commit less violence but pay a higher price for it than do white males in the prime of life. The price paid in victims for every 10 violents is 15 for boys, 16 for girls, 17 for young women, 18.5 for lower class characters, 20 for elderly women and 28 for elderly men. For the most violent groups, Hispanics and settled adults, violence and victimization are in average balance.

Violence takes on a more defining role for major characters. It involves more than half (52 percent) of all major characters (58 percent or men and 41 percent of women). Most likely to be involved either as perpetrators or victims, or both, are characters portrayed as mentally ill (84 percent), handicapped (82 percent) characters with any disability (70 percent), young adult males (69 percent), those injured (68 percent), and Hispanic Americans (64 percent).

Committing violence are 40 percent of major characters, while 43 percent fall victim to it. The most likely perpetrators are the mentally ill (70 percent), young adult males (53 percent), and disabled characters (51 percent).

The average ratio is 11 victims for every 10 major characters. Children of both genders, lower class characters, and the ill and handicapped pay the highest price (13-16) for committing violence.

Saturday morning children's program violence involves more characters than in prime time in every category, and they generally pay a higher price in victimization. The patterns are similar, Hispanics being the most violent and girls, boys and older men paying the highest price.

Major characters in Saturday morning children's programs are the most violent: 82 percent of men and 66 percent of women are involved in violence. Mentally ill characters and the few older women cast in cartoons are the most likely perpetrators, except for the even fewer Hispanics who are **all** violent. Young girls, older men and lower class characters rarely commit but often suffer violence; they pay the highest price for mayhem.

Lethal victimization extends the pattern. In prime time, about 5 percent of all and 10 percent of major characters are involved in killing. "Bad" men and women, and Hispanic and lower class characters do most killing. Older men and women, women of color, and lower class characters pay the highest relative price for their acts.

Among major characters in prime time programs, 10 percent of whom are involved in killing, for every 10 "good" (positively valued) men who kill, more then 4 are killed, while for every "good" women who kill, 6 are killed. The "kill ratio" of women of color is nearly 17. All minorities pay a higher price for killing than others do. Older men never kill or get killed, but older women get involved in violence only to get killed.

We calculated a "pecking order" of relative risks of victimization as the price for committing violence. As we have noted above, this shows imbalance between committing and suffering violence, regardless of the amount of violence inflicted and absorbed.

Women, children, young people, lower class, disabled and Asian Americans are at the bottom of the general violence "pecking order." When it comes to killing, older and Hispanic as well as the other minority groups pay a higher-than-average price. That is to say that hurting and killing by most majority groups extracts roughly a tooth for a tooth, or less. But minority groups tend to suffer greater symbolic reprisals for such transgressions.

Cultivation Analysis

Cultivation analysis attempts to ascertain what it means to be born into and grow up in a home in which television is on more than seven hours a day. In its simplest form, cultivation analysis explores whether those who spend much time with television tend to perceive the real world in ways that reflect the most common and repetitive messages and lessons of the television world. (See Morgan & Signorielli, 1990, for a detailed discussion of the theoretical assumptions and methodological procedures of cultivation analysis.)

The systematic patterns observed in television content provide the basis for formulating questions about people's conceptions of social reality. Using standard techniques of survey methodology, the questions are posed to samples (national probability, regional, or convenience samples) of children, adolescents, and adults. Secondary analysis of large scale national surveys (for example, the National Opinion Research Center's General Social Surveys) have often been used when they include questions that relate to identifiable and relevant aspects of the television world as well as measures of amount of television viewing.

Amount of television viewing is usually measured by asking how much time the respondent watches television on an average day. Other media use habits are also recorded. Respondents in each sample are divided into those who watch the most television, those who watch a moderate amount, and those who watch the least. Cultivation is assessed by comparing patterns of responses in the three viewing groups (light, medium, and heavy) while controlling for important demographic and other characteristics.

Patterns of response

Evidence of cultivation is likely to be modest in terms of absolute size. Even light viewers may be watching a fair amount of television, and, in any case, live in the same cultural environment as heavy viewers; what they do not get through television they get through others who do watch more.

Accordingly, we should not dismiss what appear to be small effects. As the cards are stacked against large differences, small effects in a large field may have profound significance. For example, a single percentage point difference in ratings is worth many millions of dollars in advertising revenue. A range of 3 to 15 percent margins (typical of most differences between light and heavy viewers) in a large and otherwise stable field often signals a landslide, a market takeover, or an epidemic, and it certainly tips the scale of any closely balanced decision or election.

The cultivation analyses reported here use data from several sources including the annual General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, the Monitoring the Future Surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, and a national survey conducted for us by the Roper Organization in 1990. Questions from these surveys measure conceptions of violence, victimization, and safety, as well as interpersonal mistrust (what we call the Mean World Index) and alienation.

Crosstabulations of these measures were run with reported amount of daily television exposure, independently controlling for important background variables (e.g., sex, age, education, etc.). Respondents were classified into light (under 2 hours each day), medium (2 to 4 hours per day), and heavy (over 4 hours each day) television viewing groups. (There are minor variations in these viewing time distinctions across surveys; the important factor is not the absolute amount of viewing but the relative differences in viewing levels.) Respondents were compared in terms of the Cultivation Differential (CD) -- the percent of heavy viewers minus the percent of light viewers who give a specific response. The degree of the relationship, within each subgroup, was measured using the gamma statistic, with significance level indicated by tau-b or tau-c.

The "Mean World" Syndrome

Data from numerous large national probability surveys (reported in detail in several articles cited in the Bibliography) indicate that long-term regular exposure to television, in addition to many other factors, tends to make an independent contribution to the feeling of living in a mean and gloomy world. The "lessons" may range from aggression to desensitization and to a sense of vulnerability and dependence (Tables 16 through 19).

For example, heavy viewers are more likely than comparable groups of light viewers to overestimate one's chances of involvement in violence; to believe that one's neighborhood is unsafe; to state that fear of crime is a very serious personal problem; and to assume that crime is rising, regardless of the facts of the case. Heavier viewers in every subgroup (defined by education, age, income, gender, newspaper reading, neighborhood, etc.) express a greater sense of apprehension than do light viewers in the same groups. Other results show that heavy viewers are also more likely to have bought new locks, watchdogs, and guns "for protection."

These patterns are of course not always the same for everyone. Victimization on television and real world fear, even if contrary to facts, are highly related. Viewers who see members of their own group have a higher calculus of risk than those of other groups develop a greater sense of apprehension, mistrust, and alienation.

"Mainstreaming"

The relationship is stronger in some groups and weaker in others. These differences across groups illustrate the dynamics of what we call "mainstreaming" -- the tendency for viewing to blur distinctions between groups, to bring heavy viewers of otherwise different groups closer together in the television "mainstream." Viewing may also leave some groups already in the "mainstream" (for reasons other than television) relatively unaffected while other groups are extremely susceptible to the television image.

Heavy viewers in most subgroups are much more likely to express feelings of gloom and alienation than the light viewers in the same groups, and these patterns remain stable in surveys over time. Many subgroup patterns show evidence of mainstreaming. For example, light viewing men are less likely to express feelings of gloom than light viewing women, while about the same percent of men and women who are heavy viewers have a high score on this Index. In other words, heavy viewing members of the genders are closer together than light viewers of the two groups. Similar patterns hold when the associations are controlled for education and income. In short, heavy viewers seem to be more homogeneous, and more likely to express gloom and alienation, than their light viewing counterparts.

Comparable findings are obtained in analyses of a nationwide survey of high school seniors called "Monitoring the Future." The students indicated how much they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements such as "I feel that I can do very little to change the way the world is today," "I often wonder if there is any real purpose to my life in light of the world situation," and "nuclear or biological annihilation will probably be the fate of all mankind, within my lifetime." The more time the respondents spent watching television, the more likely they were to agree with pessimistic and alienated views. These cultivation differences between light and heavy viewers were especially significant for respondents of color, students whose parents had not been to college, and those of a more liberal orientation. Results from a 1990 national survey of adults conducted by The Roper Organization confirm and extend these patterns (Tables 19-22). About one in five respondents says that the fear of crime is a "very serious" personal problem, but this view is more likely to be expressed by heavy viewers, overall and in most subgroups. This is especially pronounced among females and for those with more education (and both cases show mainstreaming).

Television's impact is especially pronounced in terms of how people feel about walking alone at night on a street in their own neighborhoods. Overall, less than a third of the light viewers, but almost half of the heavy viewers, say that being out alone at night on their own street is "not safe." This relationship holds up across-the-board, but the cultivation differentials are about 20 percentage points or higher for females, middle-aged respondents, and those with more education. Whatever real dangers may lurk outside people's homes, heavy television viewing is related to more intense fears and apprehensions.

These patterns illustrate the interplay of television viewing with demographic and other factors. In most subgroups, those who watch more television tend to express a heightened sense of living in a mean world of danger, mistrust and alienation. The cultivation of such anxieties is most pronounced in groups whose light viewers are the least likely to be mistrustful and apprehensive.

This unequal sense of danger, vulnerability and general unease, combined with reduced sensitivity, invites not only aggression but also exploitation and repression. Insecure people may be prone to violence but are even more likely to be dependent on authority and susceptible to deceptively simple, strong, hard-line postures. They may accept and even welcome repression if it promises to relieve their anxieties. That is the deeper problem of violence-laden television.

The Structural Basis of Television Violence

Humankind may have had more bloodthirsty eras but none as filled with *images* of violence as the present. This has generated what is probably one of the most massive concentrations of studies on a single subject. The evidence from these studies converges on the conclusion that growing up and living with these images contributes to aggression, especially among males. Our own research, as we have noted above, shows even more pervasive and debilitating relationships, affecting our sensibilities and insecurities in ways that perpetuate and even strengthen damaging social inequalities. This is not a reflection of creative freedom, viewer preference, or crime statistics. "Happy violence" is the by-product of a manufacturing and marketing process. The real problem of television violence reflects structural trends toward concentration, conglomeration and globalization in media industries and the marketing pressures fueling those trends.

Concentration, conglomeration, globalization

"Studios are clipping productions and consolidating operations, closing off gateways for newcomers," notes the trade paper Variety on the front page of its August 2, 1993 issue. The number of major studios declines while their share of domestic and global markets rises. Channels proliferate while investment in new talent drops, gateways close and creative sources shrink.

Concentration brings streamlining of production, economies of scale, and emphasis on dramatic ingredients most suitable for aggressive international promotion. Cross-media conglomeration and "synergy" means that ownership of product in one medium can be used, reviewed, promoted, and marketed in other media "in house." It means less competition, fewer alternative voices, greater emphasis on formulas that saturate more markets at a lower cost per viewer. "Privatization" of formerly public-service broadcasting around the world means production and distribution of even more of the same type of product.

There is no box office or any kind of free consumer market in television. Viewers watch by the clock, not the program. People watch television whenever they are available to the set; very few tune in to specific programs and then tune out. The total number of viewers is about the same at the same time of the day, week, and season and, as we have seen, the more they watch the less choice they have. Commercial media use programs as bait to tap into the available audience and deliver them to the advertiser at the lowest possible cost.

Competition among network programs at the same time is for marginal advantage. Most cable channels compete for the same audience with similar or recycled fare. Return on investments, attractive demographics, and low cost, rather than program quality (which may cost more) drive commercial success. "Cost per thousand," the ratio between cost and reach (per thousand viewers), is the general measure of value in commercial television. Ratings, whose comparative value is limited to a measure of the share of the audience at any one time, are one side of the equation; cost is the other. Violence becomes a key ingredient of the formula, for reasons we examine further below, despite the price it exacts in public health, freedom, fairness, and even absolute (as compared to relative-to-cost) popularity.

Not the least of the consequences is the damage done to dramatic originality and integrity. Arbitrarily contrived mechanical violence is inserted into formula-driven programs according to market conditions, not dramatic need. Warner Brothers production chief Ed Bleier admitted as much when he protested NBC president Warren Littlefield's claim that NBC turned down the Warner Brothers movie "Falling Down" because "it was too violent." Variety reported on July 17, 1993, that Bleier said the charge was "unjust, unfair and irresponsible" because NBC never asked to see the version that had the graphic violence deleted. "Scissoring will not do any damage to the movie," he explained.

The irony is that violent programming is not especially popular either with viewers or with broadcasters who are responsible to the public as license-holders, but it is with the "middlemen" who distribute the product to the ultimate marketers. Even Broadcasting & Cable editorialized (Sept. 20, 1993, p. 66) that "the most popular programming is hardly violent as anyone with a passing knowledge of Nielsen ratings will tell you. Action hours and movies have been the most popular exports for years..." Syndicators demand "action" (the code word for violence) because it "travels well around the world," said the producer of "Die Hard 2" (which killed 264 compared to 18 in "Die Hard 1," produced in 1988). "Everyone understands an action movie. If I tell in 1988). a joke, you may not get it but if a bullet goes through the window, we all know how to hit the floor, no matter the language." (Cited by Ken Auletta in "What Won't They Do," The New Yorker, May 17, 1993, pp. 45-46.)

"Action series," reported Variety on Oct. 5, 1992 (p. 21) sell particularly well if produced by the dozens. "...In today's trigger-happy marketplace, a 22-episode order is a creative (and financial) cushion for producers" because the network standard of 13 or even 6 installments "is too paltry" for cable and foreign markets where the marketers' profits come from.

"Syndicators are developing action shows with international play in mind and are triggering 20 to 22 initial hours," *Electronic Media* reported in its March 8, 1993 issue (p.4), because foreign buyers are "tired of ...series ordered in dribs and drabs of six or eight episodes - in genres they don't find appealing."

"Syndicated series find success through lowering costs, attracting international markets" was a headline in the August 17, 1992 issue of *Broadcasting* magazine. Over half of the revenues come from the international market, noted the story, and "Action-adventure and bikini-clad beachgoers play particularly well." The executive in charge of production pointed out that cutting costs reduced "the average \$1.2million-per-episode budget ...by 25%, to just over \$900,000 per episode." Critical elements have been the acting guilds and trade-craft unions making "certain concessions", and the speeding up of the weekly production schedules from six days to four days. "Production savings," it was noted, "will allow for additional expenditures to promote the series."

"Ironically," the Variety story cited above explained, as current pressures on violence make it more difficult to sell regular action shows domestically, further savings must be found, and "the networks often choose cheaper reality shows instead."

"Cost-cutting," therefore, means reducing staffs, squeezing more work in less time out of those who write scripts and create programs, developing cheaper tabloid formulas that were not acceptable before, forcing independent producers into mass-production and deficit financing to be recouped on cable, video, and the foreign market, and beefing up promotion (often in family programs) to further extend the market. The strategy delivers an audience -- even if not the largest -- at a relatively low "cost per thousand" viewers -- the formula for success. Violence delivers it worldwide.

Far from reflecting creative freedom, the strategy wastes talent, restricts freedom and chills originality. Production companies emphasizing alternative approaches to conflict, like Globalvision, Inc., G-W Associates, and Future Wave, have difficulty selling their product. Even Turner Program Services, whose CEO, Ted Turner, campaigns against violence, is forced to make compromises. Broadcasting magazine reported on August 17, 1992 that when Turner Program Services proposed to sell two unusual series worldwide, the challenge, the marketing executive said, "will be to attract males as well as females... One of the keys," he added to reassure buyers, "will be to promote the mystery and action both of these programs will have."

Public backlash

The violence formula for short-run commercial success is, in fact, a reason for popular dismay, international embarrassment and institutional stress. Of course, growing up with violence produces its addicts who then provide the core audience for even more graphic cable programs, movies, video games. But it only takes a small proportion of viewers, perhaps the equivalent of one night's television audience, to make all other violent media a commercial success. Stars, strong stories, and lavish promotion can also sell violent, as almost any other, product. But there is no evidence that, other factors being equal, violence per se is giving most viewers, countries, and citizens "what

they want."

On the contrary, the evidence is that most people suffer the violence inflicted on them with diminishing tolerance. Organizations of creative workers in media, health-professionals, law enforcement agencies, and virtually all other media-oriented professional and citizen groups have come out against "gratuitous" television violence. A March 1985 Harris survey showed that 78 percent disapprove of violence they see on television. A Gallup poll of October 1990 found 79 percent in favor of "regulating" objectionable content in television. A Times-Mirror national poll in 1993 showed that Americans who said they were "personally bothered" by violence in entertainment shows jumped to 59 percent from 44 percent in 1983. Furthermore, 80 percent said entertainment violence was "harmful" to society, compared with 64 percent in 1983, and almost twice as many people - 58 percent compared with 31 percent - said entertainment violence bothered them more than news violence (Diane Duston of the Associated Press in the Philadelphia Inquirer, March 24, 1993, p. F5).

Local broadcasters, legally responsible for what goes on the air, also oppose the overkill and complain about loss of control. *Electronic Media* reported on August 2, 1993 the results of its own survey of 100 general managers across all regions and in all market sizes. Three out of four said there is too much needless violence on television; 57 percent would like to have "more input on program content decisions."

From research to action

The Hollywood Caucus of Producers, Writers and Directors, speaking for the creative community, said in a statement issued on the eve of the August 2 conference: "We stand today at a point in time when the country's dissatisfaction with the quality of television is at an alltime high, while our own feelings of helplessness and lack of power, in not only choosing material that seeks to enrich, but also in our ability to execute to the best of our ability, is at an all-time low."

Popular concern and government's responsibility for health, education, and security led to the Washington Working Group's warning that "In the face of rising violence creating a clear public health crisis, First Amendment arguments no longer seem unassailable..." But it also added that "We can change the direction of media by a combination of audience education and effective organizing techniques."

Industry ferment and public disaffection prompted the Los Angeles "summit." The threat of restrictive action was uppermost on the minds of most participants as Senator Paul Simon, originator of the Television Violence Act, warned of a legislative backlash.

There is an alternative. It is not the 500-channel "superhighway." Given the concentration of ownership and shrinking of creative sources, the most profitable programs now being mass-produced for the vast majority of viewers will run on more channels more of the time, while informercial hustle, direct marketing, and electronicallydelivered specialized magazines catering to small audiences will fill the rest.

The alternative is not technocratic fantasy but citizen action. It is action of a liberating rather than a limiting kind. More freedom, not more censorship, is most likely to loosen the global marketing noose around the necks of producers, writers, directors, actors and journalists, and reduce television violence to its legitimate role and proportion. The role of Congress, if any, is to turn its anti-trust and civil rights oversight on the centralized and globalized industrial structures and marketing strategies that impose violence and foist it on the children of the world.

The time is ripe to augment research with such action. It combines media education with coalition-building to develop a constituency for more effective public participation in decisions about cultural investment and cultural policy.

The liberating alternative exists in the Cultural Environment Movement. CEM is a non-profit educational corporation, a new coalition of media, professional, labor, religious, health-related, women's and minority groups working for freedom from stereotyped formulas; for investing in a freer, fairer, and more diverse cultural environment; and for citizen participation in cultural decisions that shape the lives of our children.

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
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1982-83 1983-84 1984-85

1981-82

1979-80 1980-81




TABLE 1: VIOLENCE INTELEVISION NETWORKS PRIME-TIME DRAMATIC PROGRAMS(1973 — 1993)

	Sa	m p l	e s	Percent of progs	Violent Scenes	Duration of viol.	Cha	racters	Violence
Season	Pgms	Hrs	Chars	with viol.	per hr.	min/hr.	\$ V	*K	Index
1973-74	62	56.5	214	59.7	4.9	2.3	41.1	12.1	131.6
1974-75	58	60.0	224	77.6	5.5	2.8	58.5	20.5	178.8
1975-76	- 66	~ 61.0	238	69.7		2.3	54.2	13.4	160.1
1976-77	61	58.5	172	80.3	5.8	3.3	67.4	12.2	182.8
1977-78	68	62.4	210	66.2	5.9	2.3	53.8	9.0	151.8
1978-79	63	63.0	191	74.6	4.5	1.5	52.9	7.9	153.5
1979-80	64	60.7	218	70.3	5.7	2.6	53.7	6.9	153.0
1980-81	64	59.2	229	73.4	5.7	2.5	50.7	4.8	150.8
1981-82	65	57.8	216	80.0	5.9	2.5	50.0	5.6	158.0
1982-83	77	60.6	247	63.6	4.6	2.3	48.2	6.5	134.7
1983-84	63	58.8	195	73.0	4.8	2.9	53.3	9.7	154.4
1984-85	65	60.0	221	78.5	6.9	3.3	63.3	12.7	181.1
1985-86	67	61.5	217	79.1	6.8	2.6	58.5	11.1	175.0
1986-87	67	61.5	178	71.6	5.2	1.7	47.2	12.9	151.5
1987-88	75	63.3	188	74.7	5.1	1.6	58.0	7.4	158.9
1988-89	77	66.0	195	74.0	6.2	2.3	53.3	10.3	160.4
1989-90	69	56.3	174	56.5	4.7	1.1	40.2	10,9	124.8
1990-91	54	45:0	159	74.1	4.0	1.6	47.2	5.7	141.8
1991-92	61	50.5	166	62.3	5.1	1.8	49.4	11.4	141.6
1992-93	60	50.0	147	65.0	2.9	1.3	45.6	6.1	127.2
1973-93	1,306	1,173	3,999	71.2	5.3	2.2	52.3	9.9	153.7

TABLE 2: VIOLENCE INABC PRIME-TIME DRAMATIC PROGRAMS(1973 — 1993)

	_	_		Percent	Violent	Duration			···· •
		n p 1	e s	of progs	Scenes	of viol.		acters	Violence
Season	Pgms	Hrs	Chars	with viol.	per nr.	min/hr.	₹V	*K	Index
1973-74	23	19.5	80	47.8	3.9	1.0	33.8	5.0	101.0
1974-75	17	19.0	67	94.1	7.0	4.7	71.6	26.9	222.2
1975-76	2.0	19.0	75 -	75.0	7.8	2.8	66.7	9.3	181.4
1976-77	19	17.0	60	89.5	6.5	4.0	75.0	6.7	195.7
1977-78	21	18.0	66	66.7	5.0	2.3	47.0	0.0	132.3
1978-79	24	20.5	65	83.3	4.6	1.8	60.0	4.6	164.9
1979-80	23	19.0	81	60.9	4.2	2.3	38.3	1.2	115.8
1980-81	24	19.9	96	66.7	5.8	1.4	46.9	3.1	137.8
1981-82	24	18.2	75	83.3	5.5	2.1	50.7	4.0	157.5
1982-83	22	19.2	79	63.6	4.4	2.7	54.4	7.6	142.0
1983-84	18	16.7	64	83.3	6.4	4.6	51.6	14.1	173.9
1984-85	18	18.0	60	83.3	5.9	3.6	56.7	8.3	172.1
1985-86	20	20.0	68	80.0	7.2	3.4	58.8	11.8	179.6
1986-87	20	17.0	55	75.0	6.6	2.6	49.1	14.5	163.2
1987-88	23	18.0	51	65.2	5.1	2.0	56.9		144.2
1988-89	25	19.0	70	80.0	5.3	1.7	45.7	5.7	149.9
1989-90	24	18.0	57	41.7	4.3	1.3	40.4	12.3	109.5
1990-91	16	11.5	40	81.3	5.1	1.9	52.5	2.5	153.9
1991-92	18	14.5	47	66.7	4.4	1.5	53.2	6.4	142.2
1992-93	21	15.0	44	57.1	1.5	1.0	29.5	2.3	94.2
1973-93	420	357	1,300	72.2	5.3	2.4	51.9	7.5	151.6

Pgms: Number of programs Hrs: Number of program hours analyzed Chars: Number of leading characters %V: Percent of major characters involved in violence %K: Percent of major characters involved in killing Violence Index (VI)= Pct of progs with viol. + 2*(Violent scenes per pgm) + 2*(Violent scenes per hr.) + %V + %K

TABLE 3: VIOLENCE IN CBS PRIME-TIME DRAMATIC PROGRAMS (1973 — 1993)

				Percent	Violent	Duratio	n		
	Sa,	m p l e	8	of proga	Scenes	of viol		cters	Violence
Season	Pgms	Hrs	Chars	with viol.	per hr.	min/hr.	\$V	₹K	Index
1973-74	21	19.0	75	66.7	5.7	2.9	45.3	18.7	152.4
1974-75	22	20.0	80	63.6	5.7	1.7	47.5	20.0	153.1
1975-76	25	19.5	82	52.0	4.6	1.6	41.5	13.4	123.1
1976-77	24	18.0	61	70.8	4.7	1.5	54.1	8.2	149.4
1977-78	31	25.9	91	61.3	6.7	1.8	49.5	12.1	147.4
1978-79	22	20.2	65	68.2	4.4	1.6	44.6	6.2	135.9
1979-80	24	22.0	73	79.2	5.9	3.1	64.4	6.8	172.9
1980-81	22	20.2	78	68.2	4.0	1.9	44.9	5.1	133.8
1981-82	24	21.5	80	79.2	6.9	1.7	50.0	1.2	156.5
1982-83	33	21.9	95	63.6	4.9	2.7	45.3	3.2	128.4
1983-84	22	22.0	63	63.6	3.1	1.3	57.1	11.1	144.2
1984-85		21.0	82	82.6	8.1	3.1	67.1	15.9	196.8
1985-86	22	20.0	74	77.3	5.0	1.8	58.1	10,8	165.3
1986-87	21	23.0	58	85.7	5.1	1.7	60.3	20.7	188.0
1987-88	26	22.8	68	88.5	6.9	2.0	69.1	11.8	195.4
1988-89	.25	24.0	61	68.0	7.3	2.1	57.4	6.6	160.6
1989-90	18	16.5	46	77.8	6.2	1.1	43.5	15.2	160.2
1990-91	18	16.5	53	72.2	3.3	1.4	52.8	5.7	143.5
1991-92	19	16.5	51	68.4	8.2	3.2	49.0	21.6	169.6
1992-93	17	17.0	39	64.7	2.4	0.7	41.0	7.7	123.1
1973-93	459	408	1,375	71.1	5.5	1.9	52.1	11.1	155.1

TABLE 4: VIOLENCE INNBC PRIME-TIME DRAMATIC PROGRAMS(1973 — 1993)

		_		Percent	Violent	Duratio			
G		ap1 Hrs	e s Chars	of progs with viol.	Scenes	of viol min/hr.		acters %K	Violence Index
Season	Pgma	nt 8	CHALE	with vior.	per m.	METIL 197 .	••	•••	111000
1973-74	18	18.0	59	66.7	5.2	3.2	45.8	13.6	146.8
1974-75	19	21.0	77	78.9	3.8	2.2	58.4	15.6	168.9
1975-76	21	22.5	81	85.7	5.5	2.5	55.6	17.3	181.4
1976-77	18	21.5	51	83.3	6.9	4.5	74.5	23.5	211.5
1977-78	16	18.5	53	75.0	5.8	2.8	69.8	15.1	185.1
1978-79	17	22.2	61	70.6	4.6	1.0	54.1	13.1	159.0
1979-80	17	19.7	64	70.6	6.9	2.3	60.9	14.1	175.2
1980-81	18	19.0	55	88.9	7.3	4.3	65.4	7.3	191.7
1981-82	17	18.0	61	76.5	5.2	3.9	49.2	13.1	160.3
1982-83	22	19.5	73	63.6	4.5	1.5	45.2	9.6	135.2
1983-84	23	20.0	68	73.9	5.2	3.1	51.5	4.4	149.2
1984-85	24	21.0	79	70.8	6.5	3.1	64.6	12.7	172.6
1985-86	25	21.5	75	80.0	8.2	2.6	58.7	10.7	179.9
1986-87	26	21.5	65	57.7	4.1	1.0	33.8	4.6	111.1
1987-88	26	22.5	69	69.2	3.2	0.9	47.8	5.8	134.9
1988-89	27	23.0	64	74.1	5.7	3.1	57.8	18.8	171.8
1989-90	29	21.8	71	51.7	3.9	0.9	38.0	7.0	110.6
1990-91	20	17.0	66	70.0	4.0	1.6	39.4	7.6	131.8
1991-92	24	19.5	68	54.2	2.9	0.8	47.1	7.4	119.2
1992-93	22	18.0	64	72.7	4.4	2.1	59.4	7.8	155.9
1973-93	429	406	1,324	71.7	5.2	2.4	53.8	11.5	157.2
	ber of p		_						

Number of programs

Figure 1 (Minder of program hours analyzed
Chars: Number of leading characters
V: Percent of major characters involved in violence
K: Percent of major characters involved in killing

Violence Index (VI) =Pct of progs with viol. + 2*(Violent scenes per pgm) + 2*(Violent scenes per hr.) + V + K

TABLE 5: VIOLENCE INTELEVISION NETWORKS SATURDAY MORNING DRAMATIC PROGRAMS(1973 — 1993)

	Sa	m p l	e s	Percent of progs	Violent Scenes	Duration of viol.	Charac		Violence
Season	Pgms	Hrs	Chars	with viol.		min/hr.	\$V	\$K	Index
1973-74	37	18.7	145	94.5	13.2	3.4	77.2	0.7	212.2
1974-75	38	16.0	122	92.1	12.1	3.5	64.8	0.8	192.2
1975-76	45	16.3	126	91.1	16.3	4.6	84.9		221.1
1976-77	49	15.1	118	100.0	22.4	4.9	85.6	2.5	246.7
1977-78	53	16.5	145	90.6	15.6	4.0	77.2	0.0	208.8
1978-79	48	14.3	107	97.9	25.0	5.5	86.0	0.0	248.9
1979-80	62	16.5	163	91.9	17.2	3.4	74.8	010	210.3
1980-81	66	15.1	165	97.0	26.9	4.9	89.7	1.2	254.1
1981-82	69	13.5	186	91.3	30.9	6.1	83.9	0.0	249.2
1982-83	44	10.1	120	97.7	30.3	5.9	93.3	0.8	266.3
1983-84	54	13.7	142	92.6	25.5	6.0	80.3	0.0	237.0
1984-85	5 /5	14.8	146	98.2	27.3	5.9	89.7	2.1	259.3
1985-86	53	15.3	149	92.5	21.3	3.2	75.8	0.7	223.9
1986-87	38	11.6	98	92.1	25.1	3.2	72.4	4.1	234.1
1987-88	36	13.3	85	100.0	25.5	4.8	72.9	0.0	242.7
1988-89	31	10.5	76	87.1	25.5	2.2	76.3	0.0	231.7
1990-91	40	9.7	90	82.5	32.0	3.9	78.9	3.3	244.4
1991-92	43	10.7	88	76.7	26.2	4.1	69.3	3.4	214.8
1992-93	31	10.5	63	90.3	17.9		81.0	0.0	219.2
1973-93	892	262	2,334	92.4	23.0	4.4	79.7	1.1	230.7
17,3-33	. 550	202	4, JJ3	. 20.4	22.0	3,3	12.1	T • T	230.1

TABLE 6: VIOLENCE INABC SATURDAY MORNING DRAMATIC PROGRAMS(1973 — 1993)

	Sa	m p 1.	e s	Percent of proge	Violent Scenes	Duration of viol.	Charae	store	Violence
Season	Pgms	Hrs	Chars	- +		min/hr.	- V	\$K	Index
1973-74	13	6.8	46	92.3	12.5	3.2	76.1	2.2	208.7
1974-75	13	5.5	41	84.6	10.0	3.4	46.3	0.0	159.4
1975-76	18	5.3	48	83.3	14.9	2.9	79.2	0.0	201.1
1976-77	13	4.2	37	100.0	18.8	3.8	78.4	8.1	236.3
1977-78	16	5.4	48	93:8	15.9	4.7	79.2	0.0	215.6
1978-79	11	4.0	27	100.0	26.2	7.5	81.5	0.0	253.1
1979-80	11	4.5	32	90.9	15.8	4.4	87.5	0.0	222.9
1980-81	19	4.3	51	100.0	30.5	6.8	98.0	0.0	273.3
1981-82	17	3.8	48	88.2	24.0	6.1	89.6	0.0	237.0
1982-83	10	2.2	23	90.0	21.3	7.2	73.9	0.0	217.1
1983-84	11	3.9	34	100.0	18.8	5.0	78.5	0.0	229.2
1984-85	10	4.0	37	100.0	23.0	5.7	97.3	8.1	269.8
1985-86	20	4.5	47	100.0	30.7	5.0	87.2	0.0	262.3
1986-87	11	4.0	30	100.0	19.8	3.4	93.3	13.3	260.5
1987-88	8	2.8	20	100.0	28.9	5.8	80.0	0.0	258.1
1988-89	10	3.0	26	90.0	35.3	3.6	88.5	0.0	270.4
1990-91	11	2.9	22	100.0	40.2	5.1	81.8	0.0	283.7
1991-92	8	3.5	22	100.0	30.9	4.9	86.4	0.0	275.1
1992-93	7	3.5	22	100.0	18.9	5.4	95.5	0.0	252.0
1973-93	237	78.1	661	95.4	23.0	4.9	83.1	1.7	237.8

Fgms: Number of programs
Hrs: Number of program hours analyzed
Chars: Number of leading characters
%V: Percent of major characters involved in violence
%K: Percent of major characters involved in killing
Violence Index (VI)=
Pct of progs with viol. + 2*(Violent scenes per pgm) + 2*(Violent scenes per hr.) + %V + %K

TABLE 7: VIOLENCE IN CBS SATURDAY MORNING DRAMATIC PROGRAMS (1973 — 1993)

	Sa	m p 1	e s	Percent of progs	Violent Scenes	Duration of viol.			Violence
Season	Pgas	Hrs	Chars	with viol.		min/hr.	\$V	₹K	Index
1973-74	8	4.1	32	100.0	17.8	2.2	84.4	0.0	238.3
1974-75	12	6.0	44	100.0	12.0	1.7	79.5	2.3	217.8
1975-76	15	6.0	41	93.3	14.2	2.0	82.9	2.4	218.3
1976-77	17	6.0	40	100.0	19.2	1.9	87.5	0.0	239.4
1977-78	21	6.3	52	85.7	15.1	0.9	80.8	0.0	205.7
1978-79	26	6.5	57	100.0	26.8	1.2	86.0	0.0	252.9
1979-80	32	6.5	79	93.8	23.7	0.7	73.4	0.0	224.6
1980-81	29	6.2	71	96.6	32.0	1.1	93.0	1.4	269.3
1981-82	26	4.2	65	92.3	44.9	1.5	87.7	0.0	285.6
1982-83	16	3.0	43	100.0	40.3	1.1	97.7	0.0	293.5
1983-84	26	5.2	61	88.5	30.5	1.2	73.8	0.0	236.1
1984-85	30	6.0	.72	96.7	30.3	1.3	90.3	0.0	259.8
1985-86	17	5.8	48	82.4	13.9	0.8	68.8	2.1	190.8
1986-87	12	3.3	30	75.0	26.1	0.6	50.0	0.0	191.5
1987-88	12	4.5	28	100.0	20.9	1.9	85.7	0.0	243.1
1988-89	10	3.5	20	80.0	17.1	0.5	65.0	0.0	191.3
1990-91	23	4.8	48	69.6	20.6	0.5	70.8	0.0	190.3
1991-92	18	4.0	31	88.9	26.5	0.7	74.2	0.0	227.9
1992-93	21	5.5	37	85.7	19.8	0.7	75.7	0.0	211.4
	41	2.5	57	53.7	10.0	· · ·		0.0	414.4
1973-93	371	97.4	899	91.0	23.8	1.2	79.3	0.4	229.3

TABLE 8: VIOLENCE IN NBC SATURDAY MORNING DRAMATIC PROGRAMS (1973 - 1993)

	Sat	m p l	es	Percent of progs	Violent Scenes	Duration of viol.		sters	Violence
Season	Pgms	Hrs	Chars	with viol.	per hr.	min/hr.	\$V	¥K.	Index
1973-74	16	7.7	67	93.8	11.6	3.0	74.6	0.0	202.6
1974-75	13	4.5	37 .	92.3	14.9	3.9	67.6	0.0	200.0
1975-76	12	5.0	37	100.0	20.2	6.1	94.6	0.0	251.8
1976-77	19	4.9	41	100.0	29.4	5.4	90.2	0.0	264.1
1977-78	16	4.9	45	93.8	15.7	4.3	71.1	0.0	206.0
1978-79	11	3.8	23	90.9	20.8	4.7	91.3	0.0	238.1
1979-80	19	5.5	52	89.5	10.5	2.7	69.2	0.0	185.9
1980-81	18	4.5	43	94.4	16.7	2.9	74.4	2.3	212.8
1981-82	26	5.4	73	92.3	24.9	3.5	76.7	0.0	229.4
1982-83	18	4.8	54	100.0	28.4	5.3	98.1	1.9	272.3
1983-84	17	4.6	47	94.1	25.5	6.8	93.6	0.0	252.3
1984-85	15	4.7	37	100.0	27.7	5.6	81.1	0.0	253.8
1985-86	16	5.0	54	93.8	21.4	2.6	72.2	0.0	222.2
1986-87	15	4.4	38	100.0	28.6	3.8	73.7	0.0	247.8
1987-88	16	6.0	37	100.0	27.3	4.2	59.5	0.0	234.7
1988-89	11	4.0	30	90.9	25.5	1.8	73.3	0.0	233.7
1990-91	6	2.0	20	100.0	47.0	5.2	95.0	15.0	335.3
1991-92	17	3.2	35	52.9	20.6	4.3	54.3	8.6	164.8
1992-93	3	1.5	4	100.0	8.7	0.4	50.0	0.0	176.0
1973-93	284	86.4	774	93.6	22.4	4.0	76.9	1.5	228.7

Pgms: Number of programs Hrs: Number of program hours analyzed Chars: Number of leading characters %V: Percent of major characters involved in violence %K: Percent of major characters involved in killing Violence Index (VI)= Pct of progs with viol. + 2*(Violent scenes per pgm) + 2*(Violent scenes per hr.) + %V + %K

TABLE 9: VIOLENCE IN PRIME TIME, 1993,INCLUDING NON-FICTION PROGRAMS

		ent of Programs any violence %P	Rate per Program R/P	Rate per Hour R/H	Violence Index
Sit-Com	(N=36)	52.8	1.4	2.7	85.6
Action	(N=9)	88.9	5.0	4.7	165.4
Gen. Drama	(N=19)	63.2	5.4	4.2	120.8
"Reality"	(N=15)	73.3	5.3	7.5	145.9
Variety	(N=7)	85.7	13.0	11.4	195.6
News-Mag	~(N=4*)	25.0	2.3	2.2	42.0
Total (N=90)}	63.3	4.2	5.0	117.5

TABLE 10: COMPARISONS OF VIOLENCE IN CABLE-ORIGINATED AND BROADCAST NETWORK DRAMATIC PROGRAMS, FALL 1991

		Cable letwork	9	Bro Net		
	ChP1	Gen2	Tot.	ChP1	PT3	Tot.
Programs analyzed Program HRS analyzed	26 7.9	172 99.	198 7 107.6	40 9.7	54 45	94 54.8
PERCENT OF PROGRAMS WITH VIOLENCE (%P)		69.8				
NO. OF VIOLENT ACTS PER PROGRAM (NVA/P)	5.2	5.3	53	7.8	3.4	5.2
NO. OF VIOLENT ACTS PER HOUR (NVA/H)	17.3					
VIOLENT CHARACTERS			44.6			
VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE	55.6	51.5	51.9	74.4	33.3	48.2
PERCENT INVOLVED AS VIOLENTS OR VICTIMS OR BOTH (&V)	70.4	60.3	61.5	78.9	47.2	58.6
PERCENT INVOLVED AS KILLERS OR KILLED OR BOTH (%K)	3.7	10.2	9.4	3.3	5.7	4.8
VIOLENCE INDICATORS						
Program score (PS) PS=(%P)+2(NVA/P)+2(NV		98.8	100.9	162.0	88.9	106.2
Character score (CS) CS=(%V)+(%K)	74.1	70.5	70.9	82.2	52.9	63.5
VIOLENCE INDEX (VI) VI=PS+CS	196.0	169.2	171.8	244.4	141.8	169.6

1 Children's programs 2 General programs (not children's) 3 Prime time programs

TABLE 11: VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION IN MAJOR NETWORK PROGRAMS; ALL CHARACTERS, PRIME TIME (1982 - 1992)

	N	Involved violence %	in As per- petrators %		As both %	For every perpetration of vi	ors,
	(100%)						
TOTAL	10647	26.5	17.4	21.0	12.0	12.1	
Males (Tot.)	7089	31.0	21.6	24.6	15.3	11.4	
Child., adol.	623		14.4	21.8	9.1	15.1	1 Sec.
Young adult	1051	39.5	27.0	34.2	21.7	12.6	
Settled adult	5142	29.7	21.6	23.1	15.0	10.7	
Elderly	133	24.8	7.5	21.1	3.8	28.0	
Females (Tot.)	3534	17.3	8.9	13.7	5.4	15.3	
Child., adol.	479	12.5	5.8	9.4	2.7	16.1	
Young adult	777	19.0	9.7	16.6	7.2	17.2	
Settled adult	2119	17.8	9.3	13.7	5.2	14.6	
Elderly	90	15.6	6.7	13.3	4.4	20.0	
Chars. of color	1385	24.4	15.4	19.0	10.0	12.3	
AfricAmeric.	1151	23.2	15.3	17.8	9.9	11.6	
Hisp. Americ.	119	40.3	26.1	31.9	17.6	12.3	
Lower class*	77	33.8	16.9	31.2	14.3	18.5	

* Class not coded for minor chars before 1985

TABLE 12: VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION IN MAJOR NETWORK PROGRAMS; MAJOR CHARACTERS, PRIME TIME (1982 --- 1992)

	N (100%)		in As per- petrators		As both	For every 10 perpetrators, no. of victims
TOTAL	1940	52.3	39.7	42.9	30.3	10.8
Males (Tot.) Child.,adol. Young adult Settled adult Elderly	1254 119 167 916 23	68.9		49.1 46.2 59.9 47.9 26.1	1	10.5 15.3 11.4 10.1 10.0
Females (Tot.) Child.,adol. Young adult Settled adult Elderly	679 67 122	40.6 31.3	26.8 17.9 32.0 26.2 33.3	31.1 23.9 33.6 31.6 22.2		11.6 13.3 10.5 12.1 6.7
Chars. of color AfricAmeric. Hisp. Americ. Lower class Physically injro Mentally ill Physically ill Handicapped Any disability	190 14 14 1. 137 71 125 28		70.4	39.4 38.4 50.0 42.9 62.8 70.4 54.4 67.9 60.6	35.7 28.6	10.6 10.4 10.0 15.0 13.0 10.0 13.6 15.8 11.8

TABLE 13: VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION IN MAJOR NETWORK PROGRAMS; ALL CHARACTERS, SATURDAY MORNING (1982 — 1992)

	N (100%)	Involved violence %	in As per- petrators %	As victims %	As both	For every 10 perpetrators, no. of victims
TOTAL	3740	53.8	32.4	45.3	23.9	14.0
Males (Tot.)	2730	56.0	34.9	47.2	26.0	13.5
Child.,adol.	659	60.2	30.7	51.6	22.0	16.8
Young adult	413	65.9	43.3	57.9	35.4	13.4
Settled adult	1080	47.7	32.1	38.2	22.7	11.9
Elderly	62	21.0	8.1	16.1	3.2	20.0
Females (Tot.)	832	44.4	22.2	38.1	16.0	17.1
Child.,adol.	290	44.8	19.0	39.7	13.8	20.9
Young adult	136	50.0	27.2	43.4	20.6	15.9
Settled adult	268	36.2	19.8	28.7	12.3	14.5
Elderly	25	48.0	36.0	32.0	20.0	8.9
Chars. of color	174	48.9	31.0	42.5	24.7	13.7
AfricAmeric.	109	40.4	26.6	33.9	20.2	12.8
Hisp. Americ.	18	61.1	38.9	55.6	33.3	14.3
Lower class*	10	30.0	0.0	30.0	0.0	victim only

* Class not coded for minor chars before 1985

TABLE 14: VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION IN MAJOR NETWORK PROGRAMS; MAJOR CHARACTERS, SATURDAY MORNING (1982 - 1992)

	N (100%)	Involved violence	-	As victims %	As both	For every 10 perpetrators, no. of victims
TOTAL	994	79.8	56.0	72.5	48.8	12.9
Males (Tot.)	779	82.3	59.1	74.2	51.0	12.6
Child., adol.	221	72.9	40.7	67.4	35.3	16.6
Young adult	120	85.8	70.8	80.0	65.0	11.3
Settled adult	252	85.3	68.7	74.2	57.5	10.8
Elderly	11	36.4	27.3	45.5	18.2	16.7
Females (Tot.)	176	66.5	40.3	61.4	35.2	15.2
Child., adol.	75	50.7	21.3	44.0	14.7	20.6
Young adult	22	90.9	72.7	81.8	63.6	11.3
Settled adult	38	73.7	52.6	71.1	50.0	13.5
Elderly	5	80.0	80.0	80.0	80.0	10.0
Chars. of color	40	70.0	60.0	65.0	55.0	10.8
AfricAmeric.	24	58.3	45.8	58.3	45.8	12.7
Hisp. Americ.	2	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	10.0
Lower class	5	20.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	victim only
Physically injrd	1 33	90.9	54.5	90.9	54.5	16.7
Mentally ill	7	85.7	85.7	57.1	57.1	6.7
Physically ill	31	90.3	58.1	90.3	58.1	15.6
Handicapped	14	85.7	64.3	71.4	50.0	11.1
Any disability	49	91.8	61.2	83.7	53.1	13.7

TABLE 15: KILLERS AND KILLED; IN MAJOR NETWORKS; ALL CHARACTERS, PRIME TIME (1982 — 1992)

	N (100%)	Involved i killing %		Killed %	Both %	For every 10 killers, no. killed
TOTAL	10647	5.0	2.5	3.0	0.4	11.9
Men	7089	6.4	3.2	3.8	0.6	11.8
"Good men"	1643			3.0	0.1	10.2
"Bad men"	941	23.2	14.8		3.8	
Men of color	924	6.2	2.9	3.5	0.2	11.9
Elderly men	133	3.8	0.0	3.8	0.0	killed only
Women	3534	2.3	1.1	1.3	0.1	12.4
"Good" women	931	2.1	1.0	1.2	0.0	12.2
"Bad women"	175	16.0	12.0	5.7	1.7	4.8
Women of color	457	2.4	0.7	1.8	0.0	26.7
Elderly women	90	2.2	. 0.0	2.2	0.0	killed only
Chars. of color	1385	4.9	2.2	2.9	0.1	13.3
AfricAmeric.	1151	4.5	2.0	2.6	0.1	13.0
Hisp. Americ.	119	8.4	4.2	5.9	17	14.0
"Lower class"	77	9.1	2.6	7.8	1.3	30.0

TABLE 16: KILLERS AND KILLED; IN MAJOR NETWORKS; MAJOR CHARACTERS, PRIME TIME (1982 --- 1992)

	N (100%)	Involved killing	in Killers %	Killed %	Both %	For every 10 killers, no. killed
TOTAL	1940	9.8	7.5	3.7	1.3	4.9
Men	1254	~ 12.0	9.3	4.6	1.8	5.0
"Good men"	635	6.6	4.9	1.9	0.2	3.9
"Bad men"	185	44.3	36.2	17.8	9.7	4.9
Men of color	151	9.9	7.3	3.3	0.7	4.5
Elderly men	23	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	none involved
Women	679	5.9	4.4	1.9	0.4	4.3
"Good" women	350	3.7	2.3	1.4	0.0	6.3
Bad women	52	34.6	30.8	7.7	3.8	2.5
Women of color	65	12.3	4.6	7.7	0.0	16.7
Elderly women	18	5.6	0.0	5.6	0.0	killed only
Chars. of color	218	10.6	6.4	4.6	0.5	7.1
AfricAmeric.	190	10.0	6.8	3.7	0.5	5.4
Hisp. Americ.	14	7.1	7.1	7.1	7.1	10.0
"Lower class"	14	7.1	7.1	7.1	7.1	10.0
Physically injrd	l 137	11.7	5.8	9.5	3.6	16.3
Mentally ill	71	22.5	15.5	11.3	4.2	7.3
Physically ill	125	7,2	4.0	4.0	0.8	10.0
Handicapped	28	14.3	7.1	10.7	3.6	15.0
Any disability	218	13.8	8.7	8.3	3.2	9.5

TABLE 17: VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION RANKING IN MAJOR NETWORK PROGRAMS; MAJOR CHARACTERS, PRIME TIME (1982 – 1992)

Group	Number of Chars in Group	For every 10 perpetrators, no. of victims
Foreign chars of color	7	5.0
Native American	5	6.7
Elderly	41	8.3
60 and over	103	8.4
Upper Class	189	9.7
Mentally ill	71	10.0
Latino/HispAmer.	14	10.0
AfricAmeric.	190	10.4
Settled adult	1371	10.5
Male	1254	10.5
All char. of color	219	10.7
TOTAL	1940	10.8
All whites	1675	10.8
White American	1548	10.8
Foreign whites	54	10.8
Middle Class	1685	10.9
Married	343	10.9
Not Married	1149	11.0
Young adult	289	11.1
Female	679	11.6
Any disability	218	11.8
Physically injured	137	13.1
Physically ill	125	13.6
Child., adol.	186	14.8
Lower Class	14	15.0
Handicapped	28	15.8
Aslan/Pacific-Amer.	7	20.0

TABLE 18: KILLERS AND KILLED RANKING IN MAJOR NETWORK PROGRAMS; MAJOR CHARACTERS, PRIME TIME (1982 — 1992)

Group	Number of Chars in Group	For every 10 killers, no. killed
Foreign chars of color	7	None involved
Married	343	3.0
Upper Class	189	3.5
60 and over	103	3.9
White American	1548	4.0
Female	679	4.3
Settled adult	1371	4.4
All whites	1675	4.5
Child.,adol.	186	4.5
Middle Class	1685	4.7
TOTAL	1940	4.9
Male	1254	4.9
Foreign whites	54	-5.0
Not Married	1149	5.3
AfricAmeric.	190	5.4
Young adult	289	5.9
All char. of color	219	7.2
Mentally ill	71	7.3
Any disability	218	9.5
Lower Class	14	10.0
Physically ill	125	10.0
Latino/HispAmer.	14	10.0
Native American	5	10.0
Handicapped	.28	15.1
Physically injured	137	16.4
Elderly	41	Killed only
Asian/Pacific-Amer.	7	Killed only

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TABLE 19: PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS WHO SAY THAT THE DANGER OF PERSONAL VICTIMIZATION IS "VERY SERIOUS

TV viewing:	Light	Med	Heavy	Total	Gamma
Overall	16.0	21.6	23.6	21.1	.12*
GENDER :					
Male	20.0	18.2	20.4	19.0	.01
Female	12.2	25.0	25.9	23.0	.20**
AGE:		· ·			
18-34	19.1	25.1	23.1	23.6	.05
······3·S·=·5·4	13.6	18.6	23.3	18.3	.19*
55+	15.5	20.8	24.3	21.2	.14
EDUC:					
Hi School	19.6	24.8	24.3	23.9	.05
Some Coll +	12.8	17.4	22.2	17.3	.19*

Question: How serious is the danger for you personally that you might be the victim of some crime? Very serious; rather serious; not very serious; not serious at all.

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001

TABLE 20: PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS WHO SAY THAT IT IS "NOT SAFE" TO WALK ALONE AT NIGHT ON THEIR STREET

	Light	Med	Heavy	Total	Gamma
Overall	29.1	42.3	47.9	41.4	.21***
GENDER :					
Male	20.4	32.6	33.3	30.6	.16*
Female	37.3	51.8	59.0	51.2	.24***
AGE:					
18-34	23.1	40.1	39.7	37.2	.17*
35-54	28.2	38.8	52.0	39.0	.28***
55 +	42.4	50.0	54.3	50.3	.12(p=.09)
EDUC:					
Hi School	37.3	48.4	51.3	47.7	.13*
Some Coll +	21.8	33.7	41.0	32.5	.25

Question: In your opinion, is it safe to walk alone at night on the street where you live? Yes; no.

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001

TABLE 21: PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS WHO SAY THAT WHEN IT COMES TO TRUSTING PEOPLE "YOU CAN'T BE TOO CAREFUL."

TV viewing:	Light	Med	Heavy	Total	Gamma
Overall	51.6	61.9	64.1	60.6	.14**
GENDER :					
Males	50.8	56.8	63.9	57.3	.15**
Females	52.3	66.8	64.2	63.6	.12*
AGE :					· · ·
18-34	58.9	62.7	68.3	63.4	.12 (p=.06)
35-54	43.3	61.5	61.3	57.5	.22**
55 +	55.4	61.3	61.4	60.6	.05
EDUC:					
Hi School	66.6	68.5	65.2	67.3	03
Some Coll +		53.1	61.7	51.4	.27***

Question: In general, do you think that you can trust most people, or do you think that one can't be too careful in dealing with people? You can trust most people; you can't be too careful.

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001

TABLE 22: PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS WHO SAY MOST PEOPLE ARE NOT HELPFUL BUT "ARE JUST LOOKING OUT FOR THEMSELVES."

TV viewing:	Light	Med	Heavy	Total	Gamma
Overall	34.7	48.5	49.6	46.3	.16***
GENDER :			·		
Male	38.2	49.3	49.7	47.5	.12*
Female	31.6	47.7	49.5	45.3	.19**
AGE :			•		
18-34	36.6	57.2	52.5	52.5	.14*
35-54	32.7	41.9	50.5	41.5	.21**
55 +	35.5	44.3	45.6	43.6	.09
EDUC:					
Hi School	48.3	54.5	53.3	53.3	.03
Some Coll +	22.1	40.2	42.1	36.5	.26***

Question: In general, do you think most people try to be helpful or are they mainly just looking out for themselves? Most people try to be helpful; they are just looking out for themselves.

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001